Backup & Recovery

What are immutable backups and do they stop ransomware?

Key takeaways

  • Immutable backups cannot be altered or deleted for a set period, which protects recovery points from ransomware
  • Immutability does not prevent ransomware; it protects the recovery layer, so it needs testing and other defences alongside it
  • Air gaps can be physical or logical, and a cloud object lock is a virtual air gap with trade-offs to plan for

An immutable backup is a copy of data that cannot be modified, deleted or encrypted for a defined period, usually through write once, read many (WORM) storage. Vendors such as Veeam, Backblaze and Acronis sell it to protect recovery points from ransomware.

Key facts

  • Maker: Not a single product. Immutability is offered by many vendors and cloud providers. The sources here name Veeam, Backblaze, Acronis and Microsoft Azure features.
  • Announced/released (date): not stated in sources
  • Price: not stated in sources (no GBP or USD prices are given)
  • Status: In use today. CISA's #StopRansomware Guide was updated in September 2023. Veeam's blog cites a 2025 report on ransomware trends.

What is an immutable backup?

Veeam defines an immutable backup as one that cannot be modified, deleted or encrypted for a defined period of time. The data is held in a read-only state to prevent tampering, accidental modification or deletion. Acronis gives a near-identical definition: a protected backup copy that cannot be modified, overwritten or deleted during a defined retention period, with the controls applied to the storage preventing alteration until that period expires.

The reason this matters is that ransomware no longer just encrypts the files on a laptop or server. The NCSC, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre, says it has seen numerous incidents where ransomware encrypted not only the original data but also connected USB and network storage drives holding backups. Incidents have also compromised connected cloud storage locations containing backups.

Backblaze quotes a Sophos study finding that 94% of organisations hit by ransomware in the past year said the attackers tried to compromise their backups. Veeam cites a 2025 ransomware trends report, which found 89% of organisations had their backup repositories targeted. These are vendor-cited survey figures, and they point in the same direction: attackers go after backups.

How do immutable backups work?

The common mechanism is WORM storage. You write data once, and after that it can only be read for a set time. Backblaze describes its Object Lock feature this way: any attempt to manipulate, copy, encrypt, change or delete the file is rejected during the lock period. Backblaze also says that, once data is locked, no one can change it, including the data owner, the cloud provider or whoever set the lock, although governance mode locks can be overridden by users with the right capabilities.

Locks usually come in different strengths. In Backblaze's description:

  • Governance mode can be modified or overridden by users with the right app key capabilities.
  • Compliance mode cannot be removed by any user, though the retention date can be extended by users with the right capabilities.
  • Legal hold has no predetermined expiry date, and suits cases where the time horizon is unknown.

Backblaze also notes that enabling Object Lock on a bucket is a one-time operation that cannot be undone, and that once a lock is set in compliance mode, even the cloud provider cannot unlock or delete the data in response to a support request. Its documentation warns about accidentally locking data for 100 years.

Veeam lists several routes to immutability: hardened Linux repositories, object storage with S3 object locks, tape or WORM storage, and Veeam Data Cloud Vault. It says the immutability period needs careful configuration: too short and you lose rollback capability, too long and storage costs and restore points increase.

The NCSC's cloud backup principles describe the same goal in more general terms. It suggests blocking any deletion or alteration requests once a backup is created, offering soft-delete by default (where data is flagged inaccessible but remains recoverable for a period), delaying deletion requests for a pre-agreed time, and forbidding destructive requests from customer accounts, with exceptional requests authorised out-of-band. It adds a caveat: soft-delete only works if the system owner monitors the backup system's health, because an attacker who soft-deletes everything could win if nobody notices before the review period ends.

Does immutability stop ransomware?

No, and the vendors are explicit about it. Acronis states that immutability does not prevent ransomware by itself and does not replace endpoint security, anti-malware protection, patch management, access controls or employee awareness. Its argument is that immutability strengthens the recovery layer: when preventive controls fail, the organisation retains data it can restore.

There is a second limit. Acronis points out that a successfully completed backup job does not automatically guarantee successful recovery. Veeam makes a related point, saying immutable archives should still undergo backup verification and sandbox recovery testing, and that combining immutability with automated validation catches corrupted backup chains early.

CISA's #StopRansomware Guide also adds context on the threat. It describes "double extortion", where attackers both encrypt data and exfiltrate it, threatening to release the stolen data. In some cases attackers exfiltrate data and threaten to release it as their sole form of extortion, without using ransomware at all. Backups, immutable or not, help with the encryption problem but do not undo a data leak.

What is an air gap, and is object lock the same thing?

An air gap separates backups from production systems. Backblaze explains that the term comes from tape: backups are written to tape, the tapes are physically removed from the network, and a gap of air sits between backups and live systems. After an attack, you pull the previous day's tapes and restore.

Backblaze says Object Lock creates a virtual air gap: the same idea, but isolated virtually in the cloud rather than physically. A separate design study on GitHub, described by its author as an independent architecture exercise and not a production deployment, takes a similar view. It chooses logical air-gapping through subscription separation and WORM storage over a physical air gap, noting that physical isolation such as tape or offline media gives stronger isolation but at significantly higher operational complexity.

The NCSC adds a practical point about the cloud. You cannot take cloud storage offline by simply unplugging it, but you can apply similar protection. Its suggestions include:

  • Securing account identities, using NCSC password and multi-factor authentication guidance.
  • Keeping the number of backup clients to a minimum, and making sure clients do not hold valid credentials while the cloud storage is not in use.
  • Configuring access controls so only authorised clients can create new backups or append to existing ones, and so connection requests are denied while storage is not in use.

The NCSC says ransomware acting with a privilege to only create new data cannot overwrite existing backups, which it compares to traditional write-once storage that is cheaper and more scalable.

Terminology is worth keeping straight. Backblaze separates immutability, the characteristic of data that cannot be changed, from Object Lock, the function used to achieve it. And Veeam notes that CISA's guide recommends offline, encrypted backups of critical data without explicitly mentioning immutability, though Veeam argues an offline encrypted copy is a type of immutable backup. That is Veeam's interpretation of CISA's wording, not CISA's own statement.

How should you test ransomware recovery?

CISA's guide says to maintain offline, encrypted backups of critical data and to regularly test the availability and integrity of backups in a disaster recovery scenario. The NCSC adds a "recovery rule": check that data in cloud backups is restorable and recoverable. It says some cloud storage services let you restore modified data to an older version and recover deleted data for a limited time, and that you should check these features are included when choosing a provider.

The NCSC's cloud principles also include one that goes to the heart of testing: the service should let a customer restore from a backup version even if later versions become corrupted. It also lists robust key management for data-at-rest protection and alerts when significant changes or privileged actions are attempted.

The GitHub design study sketches what a validation layer might look like: restoring virtual machines to clean, isolated recovery environments, running controlled ransomware simulation exercises, and confirming recovery time and recovery point targets under realistic conditions. Treat it as one person's design exercise rather than a standard, but the ideas match the vendor and government advice.

The NCSC also sets out a third rule alongside offline and recovery: the 3-2-1 rule, which means keeping at least three copies on two devices with one offsite, so that if one backup is compromised another remains.

Which backup approach fits which situation?

This table compares the approaches discussed in the sources. It is a summary of what each source says, not a ranking.

ApproachHow it protects backupsMain strength (per sources)Main trade-off (per sources)
Traditional (mutable) backupRegular copies on connected storageEssential baseline, per AcronisCan be encrypted or deleted if an attacker reaches the repository or admin accounts
Offline or tape backupPhysically removed from the networkStrongest isolation, per the GitHub design studySignificantly higher operational complexity
Cloud object lock (WORM)Locks objects against change or deletion for a set periodVirtual air gap; works with Veeam and providers such as BackblazeCannot be disabled once enabled on a bucket; long locks raise storage costs
Soft-deleteFlags data as deleted but keeps it recoverable for a periodRecovery if an attacker deletes backupsOnly effective if someone monitors and notices before the period ends (NCSC)
Out-of-band authorisationDestructive requests need a separate pre-agreed approvalAttacker needs to compromise a second, separate systemRequires planning with the backup provider
Cloud backup with restricted access controlsClients can only create or append; connections denied when idleComparable to write-once storage, cheaper and more scalable (NCSC)Depends on provider offering advanced access controls

What does this mean for UK and US readers?

The sources point to government guidance on both sides of the Atlantic, though none quotes prices or availability for specific products.

In the UK, the NCSC publishes principles for ransomware-resistant cloud backups and a separate set for on-premises backups, plus a blog post on offline backups in the public cloud. Its guidance is written for organisations of different sizes and covers identity, client management and access control for cloud backups.

In the US, CISA's #StopRansomware Guide, updated in September 2023 and developed with the Joint Ransomware Task Force, recommends offline, encrypted backups and regular testing. It was updated to address cloud backups and zero trust architecture. It lists the FBI and NSA as co-authors, and encourages organisations to contact their local FBI field office. These figures come from Wikipedia's summary of the IC3 data.

Veeam also says immutability can help with regulatory retention requirements. Acronis adds that organisations in regulated industries may need to show that data cannot be altered or deleted during a required retention period. The sources do not name specific UK or US regulations here, so check your own obligations.

What is verified vs claimed?

Independently confirmed or from government bodies:

  • The NCSC says it has seen incidents where ransomware encrypted connected USB and network storage drives holding backups, as well as connected cloud storage locations containing backups.
  • CISA's guide recommends maintaining offline, encrypted backups of critical data and regularly testing their availability and integrity.
  • The NCSC recommends designing backups so that deletion and alteration requests are blocked or delayed, and so that an attacker cannot deny all customer access.
  • Wikipedia reports that ransomware payments were estimated at $1.1 billion in 2019, $999m in 2020, a record $1.25bn in 2023, and a drop to $813m in 2024, attributed to non-payment by victims and action by law enforcement.

Vendor claims:

  • Veeam says 89% of organisations had their backup repositories targeted, citing its 2025 Ransomware Trends report, and says CISA recognises immutable backups. Veeam's reading of CISA's wording as endorsing immutability is its own interpretation.
  • Backblaze quotes a Sophos study finding that 94% of organisations hit by ransomware in the past year said attackers tried to compromise their backups. Backblaze also says that, once locked, an object cannot be changed by anyone, including the cloud provider (governance mode locks can be overridden), and that enabling Object Lock with Veeam is as simple as checking a box. It describes itself as a certified Veeam Ready-Object and Veeam Ready-Object with Immutability partner and says it thinks all providers should support Object Lock, so it has a commercial interest.
  • Acronis says immutable backups give a more dependable recovery option, support compliance and audit readiness, and can mean the difference between controlled recovery and a prolonged outage. It also says immutability does not prevent ransomware by itself.
  • Veeam says it supports immutability natively across hardened Linux repositories, S3 object lock storage, tape or WORM storage and Veeam Data Cloud Vault, and claims that combining immutability with automated validation guarantees usability.

Unverified design material:

  • The GitHub framework is an independent design study, not tied to a production deployment. Its claims, such as platform-enforced immutability surviving full administrative compromise, are design rationale rather than tested results.

Related on Future Technology HQ - Business backup and recovery: the UK guide - Immutable vs air-gapped backups, and how long to keep them - Ransomware recovery and incident response plan: a UK guide - All explainers

Frequently asked questions ### Do immutable backups stop ransomware?

No. Acronis says immutability does not prevent ransomware by itself or replace endpoint security, patching or access controls. It protects recovery points so you can restore if attackers get in.

What is the difference between immutable and offline backups?

Offline backups are disconnected from live systems. Immutable backups can stay connected but cannot be changed or deleted for a defined period. Some forms, such as tape or WORM storage, combine both ideas.

Should I test my backups?

Yes. CISA recommends regularly testing the availability and integrity of backups in a disaster recovery scenario. Veeam says immutable archives should still go through verification and sandbox recovery testing.

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