Security

ScreenConnect SCKit worm: 288 endpoints hit via rogue clients

Key takeaways

  • Huntress saw rogue ScreenConnect clients installed on at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organisations
  • The malware is designed to spread from endpoint to technician workstation to other panels, though Huntress has not yet seen that jump succeed
  • ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions and says it has found no vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself
  • Check Run Command history, new admin accounts and Defender exclusions even if no alert has fired

How does a remote-support tool become a worm? Huntress says attackers used access to cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to push rogue ScreenConnect clients onto at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organisations, with malware designed to hop from those endpoints to the technicians who connect to them. ConnectWise, which makes ScreenConnect, has disabled five third-party extensions in partner environments as a precaution.

What the SCKit attack actually is

ScreenConnect is remote-access software used by managed service providers (MSPs), firms that run IT for other businesses, to support customer machines. A "panel" is the web console a technician uses to see and control every endpoint under their care. Whoever controls the panel controls the fleet.

The attack abuses the panel's own Run Command feature, which lets an operator execute commands on managed machines. Huntress says attackers used it to install a rogue ScreenConnect client, creating a backdoor that no longer depends on the original panel. The payload is SCKit, a custom toolkit that sets up persistent remote access and what Huntress researchers Ben Nahorney and Susannah Matt call "a relay trap for intercepting session cookies".

Neither ConnectWise nor Huntress points to a software flaw. ConnectWise says its initial assessment suggests abuse of independent third-party extensions in partner environments, and that the initial access method and full scope remain under investigation. Huntress says its telemetry points to compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions, but the exact route to panel access is unclear.

How it works

Think of a hotel master key. Stealing one room key opens one door; stealing the key a housekeeper carries opens the whole floor. The design here goes after the housekeeper.

Stage one is the Run Command push. A Base64-encoded dropper, sckit-run.bat, contacts a remote server to fetch a PowerShell payload, sckit-decoder.ps1, which launches the toolkit. Other components add Microsoft Defender exclusions, install a second attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client, create a scheduled task named "TrapWatch" and replace the legitimate ScreenConnect installation with an attacker-controlled copy.

Stage two is the worm-like part. When a technician connects to an infected endpoint, the malware can spread back to their workstation, steal saved browser sessions and authentication tokens, and pivot to other panels that technician can reach. Huntress describes a chain in which a dropper, Run-Lateral-Full.bat, fetches a loader that sends the workstation's unique ID to the attacker and receives a tailored encrypted kit. That kit steals the .aspxauth session cookie and replays it against the panel. A tool called ToolboxRelayUploader.exe then uploads a payload to the panel's Shared Toolbox, and a panel request tells every reachable session to run it, as SYSTEM, the highest privilege level on Windows.

Huntress is careful on one point: it has not seen a successful jump from an infected endpoint to a technician workstation, or from a workstation to other endpoints. Some functionality was reconstructed by analysing scripts and configuration rather than observed live. It also says at least one script appears to be LLM-generated, judging by detailed source references and explanatory comments.

Sophos reports the same modus operandi, with activity from three ScreenConnect instance IDs suspected to be compromised. It saw curl.exe download a ScreenConnect installer from 185.99.255[.]28 to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi, silent installation via msiexec.exe, and PowerShell with execution-policy bypass fetching a second-stage script from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev. Huntress names the same domain, ns.mo7sen[.]dev, in its lateral-movement chain.

Who is exposed and why it matters

ConnectWise has identified about 400 partner environments with at least one of the extensions installed, and stresses that having one does not establish compromise. The extensions provide an API capable of executing remote commands, secured by a passphrase the partner sets during setup. On-premises partners have been urged to disable them.

The MSP angle is the real concern. Huntress says the threat actor has been tagging each compromised MSP with a sequential number, and the tags it has seen start partway through the sequence, suggesting other MSPs were compromised earlier. For a UK firm, that means the risk may sit inside a supplier rather than its own network.

What the limitations are

The picture is incomplete. The entry point is unproven, the full scope is unknown, and the worm's most alarming behaviour has not been seen succeeding in the wild. ConnectWise says it is still validating its assessment. Huntress's figures of 288 endpoints and 48 organisations are minimums ("at least").

What this means in practice

ConnectWise recommends all partners ensure security controls are running, preserve suspicious activity logs and watch for:

  • unusual sign-ins, unfamiliar locations, repeated login failures and unexpected MFA prompts
  • new administrator accounts or permission changes
  • unexpected extension installs, remote commands and Toolbox activity
  • unapproved remote-access software on customer devices and technician workstations
  • unexpected support requests, password-reset messages and downloads via a trusted channel

ScreenConnect users are also advised to should check Run Command history even without alerts. Session-cookie theft sidesteps passwords, so phishing-resistant second factors help at sign-in but do not by themselves protect a stolen live session.

What UK law and guidance say

For UK organisations, an unauthorised remote-access client on a machine holding personal data may constitute a personal data breach.

Where this is heading

Attackers are going after the tools administrators trust, because a legitimate remote-access client looks normal to defenders. Expect more indicators from ConnectWise, Huntress and Sophos as the investigation continues. The sequential MSP tags suggest other MSPs may have been compromised earlier.

Frequently asked questions

What is the SCKit ScreenConnect worm?

SCKit is a custom toolkit delivered by rogue ScreenConnect clients. Huntress says it sets up persistent remote access and a relay trap that intercepts session cookies, with design features meant to spread from technicians to other panels.

Is there a ScreenConnect vulnerability behind these attacks?

ConnectWise says there is no evidence of a compromise of its infrastructure or a vulnerability in ScreenConnect. Huntress also reports no new vulnerability. Initial panel access remains unclear, with compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions suspected.

How do I check whether my ScreenConnect panel was abused?

Review Run Command history even without alerts. Look for new administrator accounts, unexpected extension installs, Toolbox activity, unapproved remote-access software and a scheduled task named TrapWatch, as ConnectWise and Huntress advise.

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