Security

Optimizely hijack: malicious code ran on 178 sites for 16 hours

Key takeaways

  • Optimizely's Experimentation platform served malicious code on at least 178 sites for about 16 hours on 16 November 2026
  • The payload escalated through the day from a crypto clipper to card skimming, cookie theft and iPhone exploit kits
  • Third-party scripts loaded by your sites are part of your attack surface, so inventory and monitor them

For about 16 hours on 16 November 2026, a single vendor compromise turned at least 178 popular websites into malware delivery points. The vendor was Optimizely, an A/B testing platform, and the affected sites included the BBC, HSBC, Equifax, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab.

The attack came through a third-party script: the hacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely's platform to add custom code, which the affected sites then loaded.

What the numbers show

According to Risky Bulletin, the malicious code ran for roughly 16 hours across at least 178 websites. Optimizely said in a statement that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in its "Experimentation" platform to add custom code for certain customers.

Technical write-ups from Report-URI, Step Security and researcher Amirul Iman show the payload changing through the day. The sequence is worth setting out, because it reads like an attacker iterating in real time:

StageWhat the code did
FirstA clipper that swapped copy-pasted cryptocurrency addresses for ones the attacker controlled
SecondA module harvesting payment card data entered online
ThirdA module collecting browser cookies and screenshots of the active page
LaterVersions of the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits aimed at older iPhones

Other high-profile sites named in the report include NPR, Fox News and Bitly. Hudson Rock, a security firm, also spotted versions of the script on three other platforms: Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. Those never loaded en masse the way the Optimizely code did and did not reach far into their client lists.

Separately, at least 12 Dutch websites, mostly sports and recreation sites, warned users that an advertising partner ran ads containing malicious code that tried to collect identifying data from older iPhone models.

What is driving this

Optimizely's job is to let customers load different versions of a site and measure which performs better. That requires running a lot of JavaScript from Optimizely on every page, with enough privilege to change what visitors see. The bug sat in a feature that lets customers load their own code on top of the normal testing function. Optimizely has not said exactly what the flaw was.

That design is the root cause. A/B testing, analytics and tag-management tools are built to modify pages and observe user behaviour, so a compromise of the vendor inherits exactly those powers. A site operator can have a spotless codebase and still serve a card skimmer, because the script is fetched fresh from someone else's infrastructure on every page load.

The escalating payloads also suggest an attacker monetising in several ways at once: crypto theft, card data, session cookies, and device compromise through exploit kits against older iPhones.

Who stands to gain and lose

Visitors to the 178 sites lose most: anyone entering card details, copying a wallet address or using an older iPhone during the window was exposed. According to Risky Bulletin, security researchers have confirmed that most of the infected sites are now clean and safe to visit.

Financial services and media firms carry the reputational and regulatory exposure. HSBC and Equifax handle payment and identity data, and the BBC and NPR carry large UK and US audiences respectively. Nothing in the source says it has acted.

Where this is heading

The use of Coruna and DarkSword against older iPhones also points to attackers treating web supply chains as a delivery route for device exploits, not only for fraud.

What to do about it

  • Inventory third-party scripts. List every externally hosted script your public pages load, including testing, analytics and advertising tools.
  • Check for exposure on 16 November. If your sites use Optimizely, review logs and the published lists from Report-URI and others, and confirm with the vendor whether your account received custom code.
  • Restrict what scripts can do. Content Security Policy and subresource controls limit where injected code can send data, though a vendor-served script that is meant to change pages is hard to constrain fully.
  • Monitor payment pages hardest. Card data entry pages should load the fewest third-party scripts possible.
  • Plan customer communication. If card or cookie data may have been exposed, decide early who notifies customers and regulators.

Watch for Optimizely's own post-incident detail on the vulnerability and for any customer breach notifications that name card or cookie exposure. Security teams should treat the next vendor script update as untrusted until proven otherwise.

Frequently asked questions

Which sites were affected by the Optimizely attack?

At least 178 sites carried the malicious code, including CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Equifax, HSBC, NPR, Fox News, Bitly and the BBC. Researchers say most infected sites are now clean and safe to visit.

How long did the Optimizely compromise last?

About 16 hours on Monday 16 November 2026, according to the Risky Bulletin report. Optimizely says it has patched the vulnerability the attacker exploited.

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