# Passkeys explained: what they are and why synced ones differ

> A passkey replaces a password with a key pair, and the private half never leaves your device or its encrypted sync. The part most explainers skip is the difference between synced and device-bound passkeys, which decides where they fit in a work account.

- Published: 2026-07-30
- Updated: 2026-11-09
- Topic: [Security](https://futuretechnologyhq.com/topic/security/)
- URL: https://futuretechnologyhq.com/article/passkeys-explained-passwords-dying/
- Publisher: [Future Technology HQ](https://futuretechnologyhq.com/), free to read. Quote as "Future Technology HQ" with a link to the article.

## Key points

- A passkey is a key pair: the website keeps only the public key, so the stored public key is useless to an attacker on its own.
- Passkeys only work on the site they were made for, so a fake login page gets nothing it can reuse.
- A synced passkey is copied, encrypted, to your Apple, Google or Microsoft account, which makes that account the one to guard.
- NIST accepts synced passkeys at AAL2 but not AAL3, because syncing means the key can be exported.
- Websites can see a Backup Eligible and a Backup State flag, so a company can tell synced passkeys from device-bound ones.

## Article

A passkey is a sign-in that has no password at all. You prove it is you with the screen lock you already use, a fingerprint, your face or a PIN, and the website checks a cryptographic signature instead of a secret you typed. That much is in every explainer. What most leave out is that there are two kinds of passkey, synced and device-bound, and the difference matters as soon as the account belongs to work.

## What a passkey actually is

When you create a passkey, your device makes a pair of keys. The website stores the public key. The private key stays with you. Google's developer guidance puts the benefit plainly: only the public key is stored by the site, and that alone is useless to an attacker, who cannot derive your private key from it.

Signing in is a challenge and a reply. The site sends a challenge, your device signs it with the private key once you unlock it, and the site checks the signature with the public key it already holds. The passkey is released by your device's screen unlock, which is what you use to sign in.

## Why phishing stops working

Passwords fail because people can be talked into typing them into the wrong place. A passkey cannot be typed anywhere. Google's guidance says passkeys are bound to a website or app's identity: the browser and operating system make sure a passkey can only be used with the website or app that created it. A fake login page gets nothing it can reuse, and you no longer have to spot the fake yourself.

## Synced and device-bound: the part that matters at work

Many passkeys are synced: the private key is copied, encrypted, into a cloud account and from there to your other devices. That is what lets a passkey follow you to a new phone.

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) calls that cloud account a sync fabric and sets rules for it in the syncable authenticators appendix of its digital identity guidelines. Keys stored there must be encrypted, access to the sync fabric must itself be protected by multi-factor authentication at AAL2 level, and the signing still has to happen on your local device. The appendix also says these authenticators should show you which services you have passkeys for and where each one has been synced.

The trade-off is spelt out in one line: syncing means the key can be exported. NIST allows synced passkeys at Authenticator Assurance Level 2 (AAL2), but says syncing violates the non-exportability requirement of AAL3, its highest level. For that, you need a key that never leaves the hardware it was made on, such as a security key.

## How a company can tell the two apart

Passkeys are built on the W3C WebAuthn standard, and NIST points to two flags a website receives when you sign in. Backup Eligible says whether the passkey can be synced. Backup State says whether it has been. NIST says verifiers may use these flags to set policies that restrict the use of syncable authenticators.

NIST is careful about where that strictness belongs. For public-facing services, it says agencies should not refuse a passkey just because it has been synced, because that would make signing in harder for ordinary users. For federal enterprise accounts, it goes further the other way: devices holding those passkeys must be under device management, and access to the sync fabric must be controlled by agency-managed accounts.

## What to do with this

For your own accounts, turn passkeys on wherever they are offered, starting with email and your password manager, and make sure the account they sync through is protected by multi-factor authentication. Our [passkeys setup order](/article/passkeys-setup-order-2026/) lists which accounts to move first.

If you run IT, the useful question is not "passkeys or passwords" but "synced or device-bound for which accounts". Admin and break-glass accounts are where a device-bound key earns its cost; our guide to [passkeys vs security keys](/article/passkeys-vs-security-keys-yubikey/) covers when a hardware key is worth buying.

## Sources

- [Google for Developers: Passkeys](https://developers.google.com/identity/passkeys)
- [NIST SP 800-63B Syncable Authenticators](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b/syncable/)
