# MFA that survives phishing: which second factors still hold up

> Security keys, passkeys and smart cards resist phishing. App codes, push prompts and texts can be caught by a fake login page.

- Published: 2026-11-10
- Topic: [Security](https://futuretechnologyhq.com/topic/security/)
- URL: https://futuretechnologyhq.com/article/mfa-that-survives-phishing-which-second-factors-still-hold/
- Publisher: [Future Technology HQ](https://futuretechnologyhq.com/), free to read. Quote as "Future Technology HQ" with a link to the article.

## Key points

- The NCSC puts FIDO2 credentials, on platform devices or roaming security keys, first among recommended types of MFA, and rates them as phishing-resistant
- CISA rates app codes and push approvals with number matching as vulnerable to phishing, and SMS or voice codes as a last resort
- Number matching stops push bombing but does not stop a fake login page
- Strong MFA only holds if weaker fallback methods, legacy protocols and excluded accounts are closed off
- Start with administrators and the help desk, then email, file storage, remote access and single sign-on

## Article

Most multi-factor authentication stops an attacker who has only a password, but a convincing fake login page can still collect a one-time code or a tapped approval and use it at once. A few second factors are built so that a phishing site gets nothing it can use, and this guide sets out which ones they are, what the official guidance says about the rest, and how a small IT team can move towards them.

## What "phishing-resistant" means

Multi-factor authentication (MFA) asks for two or more different kinds of proof at sign-in: something you know, something you have or something you are. The NCSC makes the same trade-off plain: any MFA deployment is better than using passwords alone, but not all types of MFA are equal.

NIST's authentication guidelines, SP 800-63B-4, define phishing resistance as the ability of the authentication protocol to prevent the disclosure of authentication secrets to an impostor verifier without relying on the vigilance of the claimant. Put simply, the protection has to come from the technology, not from the user spotting a fake page. Both depend on cryptography; NIST says phishing resistance requires single- or multi-factor cryptographic authentication.

On everything else the document is blunt. Passwords are not phishing-resistant. One-time password (OTP) authentication is not phishing-resistant, and nor is out-of-band authentication, where a code or prompt goes to a separate device such as a phone. For any code the user types in, NIST gives the reason: the manual entry does not bind the authenticator output to the specific session being authenticated.

## How attackers get past ordinary MFA

- **Phishing.** An email leads the user to a site that mimics the company's login portal. The user enters their username, password and the 6-digit code from their authenticator app, and the attacker passes them straight to the real service.
- **Push bombing**, also called push fatigue. An attacker who already has the password sends approval prompts until the user presses Accept.
- **SS7 exploitation.** Signalling System 7 (SS7) is the protocol phone networks use to route calls and texts. Weaknesses in it let attackers obtain codes sent by SMS or voice call.
- **SIM swap.** The attacker persuades a mobile carrier to move the victim's number to a SIM card the attacker controls, so the texts arrive with them.

## Which second factors still hold up

CISA's fact sheet lists forms of MFA from strongest to weakest, and the NCSC's guidance on MFA for corporate online services gives a similar order of preference.

### 1. FIDO2 security keys and passkeys

FIDO2 is a set of open standards from the FIDO Alliance. Its web part, WebAuthn, is the browser API that manages passkeys. CISA says the only widely available phishing-resistant authentication is FIDO/WebAuthn authentication, and the NCSC says FIDO2 MFA provides guessing resistance, phishing resistance, and theft resistance.

A FIDO authenticator can be a separate physical key connected by USB or NFC (a "roaming" authenticator) or built into a laptop or phone (a "platform" authenticator). A passkey, in the FIDO Alliance's words, is an authentication credential based on FIDO standards, stored on a phone, computer or hardware security key. Passkeys can be synced across a user's devices or bound to one device.

That choice matters at the top end. NIST says the keys on syncable authenticators are inherently exportable, and its highest assurance level, AAL3, requires a non-exportable private key. For most staff either kind is a large step up from codes. For administrator accounts, a hardware key that cannot be copied is the tidier answer.

### 2. Certificates and smart cards

CISA calls it less widely available, says it suits large and complex organisations, and warns that it requires highly mature identity management practices. In a small company it rarely makes sense unless you already run certificates for something else.

### 3. Push approvals with number matching

Number matching adds a step to a push prompt: the sign-in page shows a number and the user types it into the app. CISA rates this as resistant to push bombing but still vulnerable to phishing. The NCSC says challenge-based authenticator apps only provide partial phishing resistance because they are vulnerable to the "prompt fatigue" attack. Microsoft's documentation states that number matching is enabled for all Authenticator push notifications and that users can't opt out.

### 4. Codes from an app or a hardware token

According to CISA, codes from an authenticator app or a key-fob token are vulnerable to phishing, though SS7 and SIM swap attacks do not apply to them. The NCSC says app-based code generators are known to be vulnerable to the OTP interception phishing attack, and hardware code generators share that weakness.

Treat them as a stage on the way, not the end point.

### 5. SMS and voice calls

CISA rates SMS and voice codes as vulnerable to phishing, SS7 and SIM swap attacks, and says they should only be a last resort or a temporary measure during a move to something stronger. The NCSC says message-based methods are only likely to be appropriate when no other strengthening method is possible. NIST treats use of the public telephone network (PSTN) for out-of-band authentication as a restricted authenticator, and warns that subscribers may be exposed to additional risks when an organisation accepts one.

## The gaps that undo strong MFA

Buying security keys is the easy part. The protection holds only if an attacker cannot pick a weaker route in.

- **Weaker methods left switched on.** If a user has a security key and SMS registered and the service accepts either, the phishing page will simply ask for the text code. In Microsoft Entra ID, the ordinary MFA requirement can be met by a password plus a text message, voice call, push notification or OATH token. The built-in Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength narrows that to Windows Hello for Business or platform credential, a FIDO2 security key, or Entra certificate-based authentication (multifactor). Authentication strengths are a Conditional Access control, and Microsoft says Conditional Access needs a Microsoft Entra ID P1 licence.
- **Legacy protocols.** The NCSC warns that older sign-in protocols can mean only a password is required to get access.
- **Excluded accounts.** Service, emergency and senior staff accounts are often left out of MFA. The NCSC points out that such individuals are often ones that also have access to the most sensitive data.
- **Constant re-prompting.** Forcing a user to re-authenticate frequently will desensitise them to entering their credentials, the NCSC says, and that habit is what a phishing page relies on.
- **Recovery.** Whatever process re-registers a lost key or phone becomes the weakest point. If the help desk will reset someone's MFA after one phone call, an attacker will make that call.

## Rolling it out in a small company

1. **Start with administrators and the help desk.** CISA names help desk and IT system administrators as sensible first groups, because a compromised administrator may be able to reach any system and any data. Issue each administrator a spare key so a lost one does not lock them out.
2. **Then people with sensitive access.** CISA's examples are lawyers with e-discovery permissions to read staff email, including deleted email, and HR staff with access to personnel records. In a small firm, add whoever can change supplier bank details.
3. **Begin with email, files, remote access and identity.** CISA says attackers often target email systems, file servers and remote access systems, and try to compromise identity servers such as Active Directory. It adds that most hosted mail and single sign-on (SSO) systems, where one identity provider signs users in to many apps, support FIDO.
4. **Close the weaker routes for each group.** Once a group has enrolled, require the phishing-resistant method for them and remove SMS as a fallback.
5. **List what cannot do MFA at all.** CISA recommends identifying systems that do not support MFA, planning to upgrade or replace them, and escalating the risk to senior leadership.

## By region

- **UK.** The NCSC's [MFA guidance for corporate online services](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services) puts FIDO2 first and message-based methods last, and says you should mandate strong MFA for every user accessing sensitive data.
- **US.** CISA's [fact sheet](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf) notes that the Office of Management and Budget requires federal agencies to adopt phishing-resistant MFA methods. NIST's [SP 800-63B-4](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html) says verifiers shall offer at least one phishing-resistant option at AAL2.
- **Australia.** The Australian Signals Directorate's Essential Eight sets maturity levels for MFA. ASD's [Blueprint guidance on multi-factor authentication](https://blueprint.asd.gov.au/security-and-governance/essential-eight/multi-factor-authentication/) says access to Microsoft services at Maturity Level two and three requires phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.

## Frequently asked questions

### Is an authenticator app phishing-resistant?

No. A code from an authenticator app can be typed into a fake login page and replayed by the attacker. The NCSC says app-based code generators are vulnerable to OTP interception phishing, and CISA rates app codes and push with number matching as vulnerable to phishing.

### Are passkeys phishing-resistant?

Yes. Passkeys are FIDO credentials built on public-key cryptography, which the NCSC rates as phishing-resistant. NIST notes that synced passkeys have exportable keys, so they do not meet its highest level, AAL3, which needs a non-exportable key.

### Is SMS two-factor authentication still safe to use?

It is better than a password alone, but it is the weakest option. CISA says SMS and voice codes are vulnerable to phishing, SS7 and SIM swap attacks and should be a last resort. The NCSC says message-based methods suit only when nothing stronger is possible.

## What to do next week

1. Export the list of registered MFA methods from your identity provider and count how many users have only SMS or voice.
2. Check every administrator account: none should be excluded from MFA, and none should be able to sign in with a text code.
3. Find out whether legacy sign-in protocols are still enabled on your email service, and plan to turn them off.
4. Order security keys for administrators and the help desk, two each.
5. Write down how the help desk confirms someone's identity before resetting their MFA, and make that check harder than a phone call.

## Sources

- [CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf)
- [NCSC, Multi-factor authentication for your corporate online services](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services)
- [NCSC, Recommended types of MFA](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services/recommended-types-of-mfa)
- [NCSC, Avoiding MFA anti-patterns](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services/avoiding-mfa-anti-patterns)
- [NCSC, Mandating strong MFA for access to sensitive data](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services/mandating-strong-mfa-for-access-sensitive-data)
- [NIST, SP 800-63B-4](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html)
- [Microsoft Learn, Overview of Conditional Access authentication strengths](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strengths)
- [Microsoft Learn, How number matching works in MFA push notifications for Authenticator](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-number-match)
- [FIDO Alliance, Passkeys](https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys/)
- [ASD Blueprint, Multi-factor authentication](https://blueprint.asd.gov.au/security-and-governance/essential-eight/multi-factor-authentication/)
