# 70 countries have now signed the Artemis Accords

> On 17 July 2026, Mauritius became the 70th country, and the seventh in Africa, to sign the Artemis Accords, NASA's non-binding framework for responsible behaviour in space.

- Published: 2026-07-20
- Topic: [Space](https://futuretechnologyhq.com/topic/space/)
- URL: https://futuretechnologyhq.com/artemis-accords-70-nations/
- Publisher: [Future Technology](https://futuretechnologyhq.com/), free to read. Quote as "Future Technology" with a link to the article.

## Article

On 17 July 2026, Mauritius became the 70th country to sign the Artemis Accords, NASA's framework for how nations should behave in space: transparency about missions, interoperable systems, registering objects launched into orbit, and avoiding harmful interference with other countries' space activities and historic sites.

Signatories now span every inhabited continent, and Mauritius is the seventh African country to join. That geographic spread is the point. The Accords launched in 2020 with eight founding signatories, mostly close US allies, and critics at the time argued it would remain a small club shaped entirely around NASA's own Artemis programme.

## What the Accords actually commit you to

The commitments are practical rather than philosophical, which is part of why the list has grown so quickly. Signatories agree to operate for peaceful purposes, to publish mission plans and scientific results, to build systems that can interoperate with other nations' hardware, to render emergency assistance to personnel in distress, to register space objects, to mitigate orbital debris and to preserve sites of historic significance such as the Apollo landing areas.

None of that is onerous for a country without a space programme, and much of it restates obligations already accepted elsewhere. The list has grown from 8 founding signatories to 70, and the geographic spread has shifted decisively from a founding group made up mostly of close US allies.

## Why this is not a treaty

It's worth being precise about what the Accords actually are. They're not a binding treaty in the way the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is, and they carry no enforcement mechanism if a signatory breaks the principles it agreed to. They're better understood as a shared statement of norms, closer to a diplomatic handshake than a law.

The distinction becomes clearer set against the two existing instruments.

| | Outer Space Treaty 1967 | Moon Agreement 1979 | Artemis Accords 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal status | Binding treaty | Binding treaty | Non-binding political commitment |
| Major spacefaring nations | US, Russia, China all parties | None of the three | US and allies, not China or Russia |
| Resource extraction | Silent on private extraction | Treats resources as common heritage | Affirms extraction is not appropriation |
| Enforcement | Weak, state responsibility only | Weak | None |
| How it is changed | Formal amendment | Formal amendment | Practice and new signatures |

The middle column is the cautionary tale. The Moon Agreement was a binding treaty that attempted to treat lunar resources as the common heritage of mankind, and it attracted almost no one who could actually reach the Moon. A rule with real legal force and no relevant members governs nothing. The Accords made the opposite trade, accepting weaker legal status in exchange for the participation of the states that matter operationally.

### The space resources question

The genuinely contested provision is the one on resources. The Accords affirm that extracting and using material found on the Moon or asteroids does not constitute national appropriation, which signatories read as consistent with the Outer Space Treaty's ban on claiming celestial bodies.

Critics disagree, arguing that a right to extract, combined with the Accords' concept of safety zones around operations, amounts to de facto territorial control whatever the paperwork says. If one nation establishes a safety zone around a resource-rich crater and asks others to keep clear, the practical difference between that and a claim is thin. This is unresolved, and it is the provision most likely to be tested first.

## Who is not signing

Notably, China and Russia remain outside the framework, running their own parallel lunar cooperation instead. Their International Lunar Research Station initiative has recruited its own partners, which means the Moon is heading towards two blocs with separate standards, separate hardware and no agreed deconfliction process between them.

That is the structural weakness, and it is not a hypothetical one. The Accords coordinate behaviour among signatories well enough, but the scenario that actually produces an incident is a signatory and a non-signatory operating near each other, where no shared framework exists at all. Several states have also signed the Accords while cooperating with the rival initiative, so the two blocs overlap rather than dividing cleanly.

## What 70 signatures buys

Still, 70 countries agreeing on anything in space policy is not nothing. As more nations plan their own lunar and [orbital missions](/private-pilots-space-force-orbital/), having a common rulebook, even a voluntary one, reduces the odds of the kind of orbital debris disputes or landing-site conflicts that could otherwise turn into diplomatic incidents.

The practical value is interoperability as much as diplomacy. Agreeing on docking standards, communication protocols and data formats in advance is what makes it possible for one nation's vehicle to assist another's crew, and the emergency assistance commitment is meaningless without it. For smaller signatories the benefit is access: a seat at the table where those standards get written, and a credential that helps domestic space firms work with established agencies.

### The first real test

Whether the Accords hold up once a real disagreement tests them is still unproven. The scenario most likely to do it is two missions wanting the same ground, and the candidates are already known: a handful of permanently shadowed craters near the lunar south pole where water ice is concentrated and sunlight for power is available on nearby ridges. There are not many such locations, and most serious lunar plans target the same few.

The money involved guarantees the pressure. Nobody writes off an investment of that size over a norms document, which is precisely why the first genuine collision of interests will reveal what these signatures are worth. Hardware decisions are being locked in now, from [the Artemis III crew assignments](/artemis-3-crew-earth-orbit/) to [the Artemis IV spacesuit redesign](/nasa-artemis-iv-spacesuit-redesign/).

For now, the number keeps climbing.

## Key takeaways

- Mauritius became the 70th Artemis Accords signatory on 17 July 2026, up from 8 founders in 2020.
- The spread is now genuinely global, with seven African signatories, rather than the original US-allied core.
- These are political commitments, not law. There is no enforcement mechanism, which is the trade made to get operationally relevant states to join.
- The 1979 Moon Agreement shows why that trade was made: binding force, few parties, and none of the major spacefaring nations.
- Resource extraction is the contested provision. The Accords say extraction is not appropriation; critics argue extraction plus safety zones is territorial control by another name.
- China and Russia remain outside with a rival lunar initiative, so the likeliest incident involves a signatory and a non-signatory, where no shared rules apply.
- The first real test will be competition for the few ice-rich lunar south pole sites.

## Sources

- [Mirage News (US State Department release)](https://www.miragenews.com/us-welcomes-mauritius-to-artemis-accords-1712235/)
- [Wikipedia: Artemis Accords](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artemis_Accords)